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The Social and Political Life of a Relic: The Episode of
the Moi-e-Muqaddas Theft in Kashmir, 1963–1964

Idrees Kanth

The present article is focused on the
relationship between a sacred object: the
moi-e-muqaddas (the Prophet’s hair), housed
in the Hazratbal shrine in Kashmir, and the
Kashmiri Muslim community. The relic, which
was stolen from the shrine on 27 December
1963, lead to a massive protest in the Kashmir
valley and in other parts of the subcontinent, as
people demanded its immediate recovery. Such
thefts, which have been reported from across
the world and across centuries, point to the
extreme value of the relics, and the additional
value they generate when they are stolen.
Similarly, the Hazratbal relic theft became a
vehicle for reifying certain Kashmiri Muslim
social and political sentiments. The incident
also catapulted the issue of Kashmir’s political
accession, which emerged in 1947 at the time
of the partition of the subcontinent, to the
forefront, alarming the Indian government.

The Hazratbal relic episode is also reflective
of the role of religious ideas and symbols in
political action in South Asia.
Keywords: Kashmir, shrine, relic, theft, politics.
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Introduction
In an introductory note to a booklet: ‘Moi-e-Muqaddas
Nabwi Hazratbal Srinagar’ (The Sacred Hair of the Prophet
in Hazratbal Srinagar), the veteran Kashmiri journalist Sufi
Mohi-ud-din remarks that it was a spiritually enlightening
moment for the Kashmiri community when the ‘moi-emuqaddas nabwi’ (The sacred hair of the Prophet) made its
entrance into the Valley of Kashmir. The presence of the
Prophet’s hair in Kashmir is not only a saadat (blessing)
for its people, as Sufi emphasises, it has almost elevated
Kashmir to the status of Medina: ‘Kashmir Medina ba-shud
az moi-e-nabi’ (Bhat 1999: 1). The moi-e-muqaddas, and the
Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, where it is preserved, has
had an immense bearing on the social and political life
of Kashmir. Over the centuries, the Hazratbal shrine has
captivated the attention of Kashmir’s rulers, who while
they have duly acknowledged its spiritual munificence,
have also realized the political authority that the shrine
wields. Yet there have been a few occasions, as Sufi writes,
when Kashmir’s rulers have tried to undermine the prestige of the moi-e-muqaddas, including the Afghan governor
of Kashmir, Azad Khan, who had to pay for his life after he
tried to disgrace the relic by removing it from its glass seal.
There is a popular belief that, whoever has tried to abuse
the moi-e-muqaddas, has eventually met with a terrible
fate (Bhat 1999: 2).
The presence of the moi-e-muqaddas in Hazratbal has
bestowed it the status of the most important and spiritually elevated shrine in Kashmir. While the shrine has
attracted hundreds of thousands across the Valley over the
last two and a half centuries, it has also played a significant
role in the social and political life of the people of Kashmir
(Khan 1989: 173). When the relic, intensely venerated by
the Kashmiri people, went missing from the shrine in
the last week of December 1963, there was an immense
outpour of emotion across the Valley of Kashmir, as people
demanded its recovery, and punishment for those who
were culpable of stealing it.
The disappearance of the relic created ruptures at
multiple levels, fomenting a palpable sense of consciousness and unity in the otherwise internally divided
Kashmiri Muslim community. It also became an instrument for people to articulate their sentiments related to
the political future of Kashmir more pronouncedly. This
essay seeks to make sense of these various sentiments
that the relic invokes or invoked, especially following its
disappearance from the shrine.
The emotion that the theft generated heightened the religious and regional consciousness of the Kashmiri Muslim
community, affirming certain boundaries in the process.
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The incident and its aftermath brought to the forefront the
many relationships that have defined Kashmir’s contemporary history and politics: the relationship between
the Kashmiri Muslim community and the local state, the
relationship between the Kashmir state and the Indian
state, and also the relationship between India and Pakistan
in the context of Kashmir. The relic issue not only unsettled New Delhi and particularly Nehru, it also produced
reverberations in places as far off as Calcutta and even East
Pakistan, where communal riots broke out. While Pakistan
protested that the theft was committed on the orders of
the Indian government, and used the incident to raise
the Kashmir issue—the status and conflict over political
sovereignty of the region that emerged from the partition
of the subcontinent in 1947, which has since engaged India,
Pakistan, and the Kashmiris on the question of the political
accession of the state (Bose 2003)—in the Security Council,
India complained that Pakistan exploited the situation to
benefit its agenda in Kashmir.
The present article seeks to investigate the sacred, social
and political relationships that tie the Kashmiri Muslim
community with the relic, especially as these relationships
come to fore and become more palpable following its theft
in December 1963. While it discusses the relationship
between the moi-e-muqaddas and the people, the article
does not concern itself with finding out the perpetrators
of the relic theft. Nor does it really seek to focus as much
on the mode and specificity of the protests that followed
the theft. It examines the relic as an object of reverence
and celebrity and seeks to understand both why the
relic has come to be regarded as sacred by its adherents,
and the political sentiment that it’s theft precipitates
(Walsham 2010: 10). The study of relics, as Patrick Geary
rightly observes is not often about the object, but rather
people (Geary 1990: 3). Material remains become relics as
a consequence of the beliefs and practices that accumulate
around them. They are the products and confections of the
cultures that engender and reverence them. The making
of them is thus both a social and a cognitive process
(Walsham 2010: 14).
Relics: Objects of Veneration, Instruments of Power
A relic is a material object that relates to a particular individual or to events and places with which that individual
was associated. Typically, it is the body or fragment of
the body of a deceased person. Alongside corporeal relics
such as skulls, bones, blood, teeth, hair, and fingernails,
are non-corporeal items that were possessed by or came
into direct contact with the individual in question. These
may be articles of clothing: hats, girdles, capes, smocks,
shoes, and sandals, or pieces of personal property like

cups, spectacles, handkerchiefs, weapons, staves, and bells
(Walsham 2010: 11). In a fundamental sense, a relic is a
metonymy for the person of a prophet, saint, or other holy
person (Meri 2010: 103).
A relic is ontologically different from a representation or
image. It is not a mere symbol or indicator of divine presence, but an actual physical embodiment of it, each particle
encapsulating the essence of the departed person, in its
entirety (Walsham 2010: 12). However, the relics themselves, physical remains of saints, are essentially passive
and neutral. It is the individuals, the people, who come into
contact with these objects, giving them value and assimilating them into their history, who are the proper subjects
of historical inquiry (Geary 1990: 4). Nevertheless, there
is no way that human and material agency can be disentangled. The agency of the relic is eventually a mediated
activity between the human and the material object. It is
the relational and emergent product of material engagement (Malafouris 2008: 34). In other words, the properties
of the materials are relational and processual. They are
neither objectively determined nor subjectively imagined
but are practically experienced (Ingold 2007: 14).
Relics have also functioned as political devices across a
range of cultures (Walsham 2010: 27). While their veneration creates a ritually bounded community, they have
often become sources and instruments of political legitimation (Schober 1997: 220). Muslim rulers and caliphs
yoked themselves to the Prophet Muhammad through
the ownership of his staff and mantle, by employing these
objects in investiture ceremonies, and by carrying them
into battle as powerful totems. Similarly the legitimacy of
British colonial rule of Sri Lanka after 1815 in the eyes of
its inhabitants was apparently sealed by its custodianship
of the Buddha’s tooth, possession of which was an ancient
prerogative and attribute of kingship (Walsham 2010: 27).
Relics thus operate as vectors and embodiments of
authority and legitimacy, but also as foci for political
protest. The relic, as Alexandra Walsham writes, has the
capacity to act as a form of symbolic capital (Walsham
2010: 25). Initially buried anonymously to hinder veneration, the body of Che Guevara, Castro’s chief lieutenant
in the Cuban Revolution executed in Bolivia in 1967, was
later resurrected and revered as that of a martyr to his
anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideals (Walsham 2010:
27-28). Relics and other material objects often tend to
have political afterlives and get invoked and manipulated
as nationalist symbols by the state and by people across
classes (Walsham 2010: 28).

In Kashmir, the hundreds of ziarat and dargah (shrines),
spread across the Valley are endowed with relics, both
corporeal and non-corporeal, of saints and holy men
highly venerated by the people of the region. Of these, the
Hazratbal dargah is recognised as the most sacred because
it houses the moi-e-muqaddas. The shrine has also been a
powerful political platform for the Kashmiri leaders to
further their political objectives. The influx of devotees to
the dargah from across the vast geographical area of the
Valley reveals the significance of Hazratbal as a symbol of
Kashmiri Muslim unity, both as a religious and a regional
community (Khan 1989: 181).
The Hazratbal Dargah in the Life of the Community
Unlike the mosque where the formal, communitarian
gatherings take place, the shrine or the dargah is the
preferred place for individual or family outings, especially
for the occasion of urs (festivities associated with the death
anniversary of a saint) celebration. On this occasion a very
large group gathers for prayers and for social celebration
in the form of a mela (religious festival) (Jackson 1989:
110). The shrines thus encourage social participation, and
serve as specialised loci within which the particular and
relatively mundane problems of visitors may be alleviated
(Kurin 1983: 312). Shrines are therefore, imbued with the
idea of the sacred, and in turn manifest sacredness.1
Shrines have been a central component of Kashmiri society
in general, and Kashmiri Islam in particular. The position
of the shrine in the religious, social and economic life of
the Valley is legendary (Zutshi 2014: 121, 127). Kashmiri
Muslims visit shrines for health, procreation, longevity,
and relief from floods, famine or diseases, etc. (Khan 1989:
178). They believe that a visit to the shrines will secure the
object of their wishes. Sick men will regain health, women
will be vouchsafed children, and the litigant will win their
case (Lawrence 1967: 289-290). Of the many shrines in
Kashmir the Hazratbal dargah is the most revered one,
because it houses the sacred hair or relic of the Prophet
Muhammad, the moi-e-muqaddas, also called moi-e-mubarak
or moi-e-sharief (Bhat 1999: 1-2).2
The display of relics and their veneration and adoration
by people has a long tradition in Kashmir’s history. Hiuen
Tsiang, the Chinese traveller who visited the Valley of
Kashmir in 631 has written about the tooth of Buddha
and its veneration by the Buddhist monks of the region
(Khan 1989: 176; Kaul 2005: 160, 163-164). Similarly, the
custodians of numerous shrines in Kashmir have preserved
the relics and belongings of various saints, and they are
displayed to the devotees on their anniversaries.
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The preservation of some of these relics and their public
exhibition on special occasions may speak of the assimilation of the local Hindu-Buddhist practices among the
Muslims of Kashmir (Khan 1994: 82). A special characteristic of the devotees during such gatherings is their focus
on the relic, the object of veneration, with folded hands.
The devotees may also touch the grave and relics of the
departed saint to seek benediction (Khan 1994: 82, 228).
Similarly, the moi-e-muqaddas represents for Kashmiri
Muslims an object that can be approached with the hope of
gaining spiritual and material benefits from the supernatural presence and powers that such an object is believed
to inhabit or manifest (Jacobsen et al. 2015: 1). Such
objects are defined as sacred and protected from private
trespass by both prohibiting and prescribing certain types
of behaviour in relation to them (Wheeler 2006: 10). The
religious potency of such objects is not only apparent
from the distinctive forms of behaviour that range from
gestures and postures of veneration, but also through the
construction of built environments within which these
relics function (Trainor 2010: 271).
The Kashmir historian Ishaq Khan observes that for the
devotees the shrine of Hazratbal, by virtue of being the
repository of the Prophet’s relic, is a place of interaction and communication between the Prophet, who is
visualised as spiritually alive through his relic, and his
followers. The practice of visiting the Hazratbal dargah
has therefore been a marked feature in the religious life
of Kashmiri Muslims (Khan 1989: 175, 177). Apart from
the usual crowd that throngs the shrine everyday, and
more so on Fridays, every year on the occasion of two
festivals: Milad-un-Nabi (birthday of the Prophet) and
Mairaj-i-Alam (the day commemorating the Prophet’s
heavenly journey), thousands of people flock to Hazratbal
from all parts of the Kashmir valley (Khan 1989: 174).3 The
Valley is supposedly the only region in the Muslim world
where devotees observe an exceedingly long set of rituals
beginning from the night proceeding the two important
events (Khan 2007: 149-181).4 These are occasions among
others ones in the year, all connected with some events
in the Prophet’s life, on which the holy relic is exposed to
the people (Mullik 1971: 119).
From several folk songs and poems composed in Kashmiri
in praise of the relic, it is evident that there has always
been an endeavour to attribute the privileges of Medina
to Hazratbal (Khan 1989: 175). Even today devotees are
seen touching the hands, body or even the dress of the
custodian exhibiting the relic in the hope of receiving a
baraka5 (blessing) besides making vows and offering gifts
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to the sacred shrine in return for granting of their desires.
This reverence for the sacred hair and its custodians may
be seen to have fostered what can almost be termed a
patron-client relationship in a system of pir-muridi6 (the
relationship between a spiritual master [pir] and his
disciple [murid]) which has marked the life of the shrine
in the past (Khan 1989: 179). Though reformists have at
various points criticized the worship of the divine through
material objects as idolatry in attempts to restore and
emphasise the importance of religious teachings and
doctrines (Jacobsen et al. 2015: 1), it has not stopped devotees from visiting the shrines, and holding them in deepest
reverence. In Kashmir, while the Ahl-e-Hadith,7 and other
orthodox sects have sought to diminish the importance
of Hazratbal and generate doubts about the authenticity
of the relic, such attempts at deprecating the sacredness
and venerability of the shrine have seldom met with
success (Khan 1989: 175).
The Hazratbal shrine also has an economic significance.
Following prayers and worship especially during festivities, nearly everyone indulges in sales purchases and
amusement, as the area around the shrine turns into
a mart with shops of grocers, drapers, fruit sellers and
confectioners (Lal 1913). Hazratbal has also offered
economic opportunities to merchants and artisans who
could do good business in the precincts and the neighbourhood of the shrine. To those businessmen who find
it difficult to sell their goods all through the year, the six
annual fairs, coupled with the regular Friday congregations at the shrine, offers a suitable outlet for their surplus
products (Lal 1913).
The shrine has also stood as a political platform symbolising the regional consciousness of the Kashmiri people.
Hazratbal is to the Kashmiri Muslims, as one journalist
wrote in the context of a siege that the Indian army was
laid on the shrine in the early nineties, what the Golden
Temple represents to the Sikhs (Baweja 1993). Reporting
on the siege, which lasted over fifteen days to remove forty
odd militants housed inside the shrine premises, the journalist duly acknowledged, as did many others, that it not
only hurt the sentiments of the Valley Muslims, but also
made the Kashmir issue more visible on the international
platform (Baweja 1993: 18-29). The episode offers one
among many other examples of the power and authority
that the shrine wields as a social and political space, and its
overall significance in the life of the Kashmiri people.
Realizing the importance of the Hazratbal shrine, Sheikh
Abdullah, the most prominent Kashmiri political leader,
brought it under the control of the Auqaf8 in 1943. Soon the

shrine became an important site for promoting the politics
of National Conference that Abdullah espoused and which
stood in stark opposition to that of the Muslim Conference,
the organization that controlled the other important
religious power center: the Jamia Masjid, in downtown
Srinagar.9 After Abdullah’s expulsion from the office of
Prime Minister10 of Kashmir in 1953 on the orders of the
central Indian government, the shrine became a platform
for the Kashmiri Muslim leadership to further its political
objectives and to seek the release of Abdullah (Khan 1989:
181). Later in the 1960s and onwards into 1970s, Abdullah
focused his attention on the reconstruction of the shrine.
He demolished the old historical Hazratbal mosque built in
the seventeenth century, considered one of the best specimens of the wooden architecture of Kashmir, to rebuilt
it on an Islamic pattern, to immortalise his political links
with the dargah, and to gain further popularity among the
local people. He toured various parts of the Valley and
visited almost every house, particularly in Srinagar city, to
raise funds for its reconstruction (Khan 1989: 186-187).
Given the immense significance that the Hazratbal shrine
holds in the life of the Kashmiri Muslim community, the
wave of resentment and anger that the theft of the relic
generated is therefore, quite self-explanatory.
The Moi-e-Muqaddas
Unlike other prophets and holy persons, Prophet
Muhammad became the object of veneration precisely
because his teachings, sayings and silent affirmations
were meticulously preserved by his companions and his
family and transmitted to subsequent generations, who
also preserved and employed his relics: hair, and sweat
and water from prayer ablution as relics, seeking to derive
baraka from them even after his death (Meri 2010: 102-104).
Islamic commentaries and reports indicate that the
Prophet distributed his hair after shaving for ihlal (the
desacralisation ritual) after his final and only pilgrimage
to Mecca.11 Al-Bukhari and Muslim cite a report in which it
is said that the Prophet cut his hair upon completing the
pilgrimage, and instructed Abu Talhah to distribute one
share of the hair to each of the sahabah (male companions
of the Prophet), and to Abu Talhah’s wife Umm Sulaym to
distribute two shares to the women (Wheeler 2006: 72).
According to another account, it was this distribution
that established the tradition of baraka being associated
with the hair of the Prophet. Other reports and accounts
mention that the Prophet Muhammad made this distribution at the completion of his pilgrimage so that his
followers could keep the objects as relics, and that there

was no hair that fell from his head that was not collected
by his followers (Wheeler 2006: 72, 2010: 341-388). There
are also multiple traditions and accounts associated with
the further transportation of the Prophet’s hair and other
relics. The transportation of hair by the companions of
the Prophet and farther distribution of this hair through
conquest is evident from the records of burial, especially
at sites of martyrdom or conquest, as Brannon Wheeler
mentions in his book.
In the context of Kashmir, it is reported that a rich local
merchant, Khwaja Nuruddin Ishbari purchased the holy
relic for one hundred thousand rupees from Sayyid
Abdullah of Bijapur, who had brought it to the Deccan from
Medina (Khan 1989: 174). Ishbari died on his way home
from Bijapur in 1699, and the relic was brought to Srinagar
along with his dead body. As a mark of respect in response
to popular sentiment, Fazil Khan, the Mughal governor of
Kashmir ordered that the relic be housed at a mosque in
Bagh-i-Sadiqabad, an area situated on the western bank
of the Dal Lake. The place has since come to be known as
Hazratbal, the abode of the Prophet Muhammad, while
the shrine is referred to as Asar-i-sharif (relic shrine) (Khan
1989: 174). Gradually a village grew around the shrine
(Mullik 1971: 117).
Since the sacred hair was kept at Hazratbal, the place
became the center of pilgrimage for Kashmiri Muslims. As
mentioned, Hazratbal signifies the Medina thani (second
Medina) for its devotees in the Valley. This as Ishaq Khan
informs us arose not only from the devotees’ unbounded
veneration of the Prophet but also from practical difficulties in performing the sacred duty of the hajj (Khan
1989: 177). Hajj was beyond their reach owing to the abject
poverty in which they lived. Thus a visit to the shrine
would, at least, have reduced in the devotees’ religious
consciousness the physical barriers between the Arab and
the Ajam (non-Arab world). This sentiment is reflected in
the following verses:
Whosoever has seen the sacred hair of Muhammad,
He has seen the vision of the Prophet,
[Although] he is entombed in Arabia,
His sacred hair sanctifies the Ajam
He reveals the eternal reality of his radiance only to
those in Kashmir
Who have an abiding faith and are spiritually illuminated (Khan 1989: 177).
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The local tradition goes that the moi-e-muqaddas had been
stolen or surreptitiously removed on two occasions in the
past, but on both these occasions it came back to Hazratbal
by a miracle. The locals believe that the moi-e-muqaddas
had by its own grace travelled from Arabia to the Hazratbal
lake in Kashmir and would not allow itself to be removed
for any considerable period from its place of rest and
would always come back (Mullik 1971: 118-119).
Even when it was removed to the mosque, the relic
remained under the control of Nuruddin Ishbari’s descendants, and they were the only people who were entitled
to exhibit the moi-e-muqaddas to the public (Mullik 1971:
117, 119). Every year on special occasions the relic with the
large silver trapping is offered for deedar from the balcony
of the Hazratbal mosque, to show it to thousands of
pilgrims congregated in the huge yard in front. Despite the
stray apprehensions that the relic was not well protected,
the belief was that it protects itself. However, in the
winter of 1963, towards the end of the December month,
the Kashmiri people were in for a rude shock. The relic
was stolen.
The Theft of the Relic
Oh zalimo, waapas karo
[Oh tyrants, return it back] (Gauhar 1998: 93).
On the intervening night of 26 and 27 December 1963, the
moi-e-muqaddas was stolen from its repository at the shrine
of Hazratbal in Srinagar. The wooden box containing the
relic had been taken out from the small shelf in which it
had been kept, after forcing the shelf open. The last time
when a deedar had been given was on 20 December 1963.
After the deedar, Abdul Rahim Banday, the mutawalli (a
senior custodian of the shrine), had put the relic back in its
place (Mullik 1971: 119).
The news about the loss of the relic travelled like wild
fire throughout the snowbound Kashmir valley. And
even though weather conditions were not pleasant12
large crowds started collecting at the shrine from
early morning (Malhotra 2010). By the afternoon of 27
December, thousands of people were marching through
the streets of Srinagar, protesting against the theft and
demanding its immediate restoration. The town observed
a spontaneous and complete hartal (strike). The sentiments of the people of the Valley “had been deeply hurt
due to the sacrilege committed in respect of something,
which they held to be highly sacred and dearer than even
their lives” (Mullik 1971: 120).
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The hartal continued over the next day on 28 December,
paralysing the Srinagar city completely. All stores and
offices were closed and taxis and horse-drawn carriages
were taken off the roads.13 Processions from different
parts of the city and adjoining areas started marching
towards the city center, Lal Chowk, gathering into a great
jaloos (procession), raising slogans and waving black flags.
Women were also involved in the protests, occupying the
other end of Lal Chowk. At the Residency road, near Lal
Chowk, the jaloos was intercepted by Bakshi Abdul Rashid,
the General Secretary of the ruling National Conference
government, and the cousin of the former Prime Minister
of the state, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who arrived on
the scene in his blue Chevrolet. Rashid told the crowd to
disperse and not to create any trouble. His interception
however, proved counter-productive and incited the
crowd who started throwing kangris (portable fire pots
used to keep warm in the Kashmiri winter) at him. His car
was also overturned, and later burnt. While he escaped the
scene, the incident galvanised the entire public opinion
against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his family and
blamed them for the theft. This triggered further rage
in the crowd and they burnt down, two movie theatres,
Amreesh and Regal, that were owned by Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammad’s brother, Bakshi Abdul Majeed (Bhat 1980:
104; Swami 2007: 42).14
On Residency Road, they even attempted to attack the
All India Radio Station in Srinagar. However, the police
intervened and saved the building from being damaged
(Mullik 1971: 122). The attack on the station may have been
spontaneous, but it could be suggestive of an emerging
consciousness among the protestors that the local state
at the behest of the powers in India may have carried out
the theft. In the opinion of an officer, the excited crowd
carried out the attack because, according to them, the
station did not give a correct account of the previous
evening’s happenings (Mullik 1971: 122).
Others claimed that the Radio Station was generally an
instrument of false propaganda, and thus an object of ire
(Bhat 1980: 104). Meanwhile wave upon wave of people
continued to pour in from across the Valley, converging at
Hazratbal. En route to Hazratbal volunteers had organised
free snacks, hot tea, lunches and dinners. The Pandits and
Sikhs were also out on the roads to provide moral support
to the Muslim protestors (Gauhar 1998: 94).15
While the crowd dispersed in the evening, the intensity
of the public’s anger unsettled the corridors of power
in Delhi. Hours later in a special radio broadcast on All
India Radio: ‘Address to the Nation’, usually delivered

on the Independence Day of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, the
Indian Prime Minister appealed to the Kashmiri people
“to exercise restraint at this hour of national tragedy”
(Gauhar 1998: 95). He also assured them that the relic
incident would be thoroughly investigated. However,
Nehru’s speech made little impact on the protestors, even
as he reiterated his commitment to investigate the matter
in yet another radio broadcast on the next evening of 29
December. In fact, the situation became only more volatile,
forcing the central government to send over an Indian
Civil Services officer, V. Viswanathan, the Home Secretary,
to Kashmir, to tackle the situation. A few officers of the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), including its director
B. N. Mullik, also reached Srinagar on 30 December to help
with the investigation process. Earlier, arrangements had
been made for moving a Punjab Armed Police and a Central
Reserve Police battalion to Kashmir (Bhat 1980: 104-105).
People seemed unfazed by all these developments and the
hartal continued unabated over the next few days. Multiple
gatherings of protestors would as usual assemble around
in the city demanding the recovery of the moi-e-muqaddas.
On one occasion, the Armed Police reinforcements fired
at protestors at three places around the Lal Chowk area,
killing a few people and injuring a dozen more. Mullik
noted that “the entire Kashmir valley was breaking up
and something had to be done within a week, otherwise
there was every danger of a conflagration with Pakistan
over this.” He was particularly concerned that the Pakistan
Radio was gloating over the incidents in Kashmir and loudly
accusing the Indian government for having engineered
the theft to suppress the Muslims of the valley, and that
“there were people in Kashmir who were moved by this
form of propaganda” (Mullik 1971: 123). Here is how Mullik
describes a typical day during the course of the agitation:
Everything was closed: offices, schools, shops, cinemas, restaurants. Langars (eating places) had been
set up at various places in the town. Large crowds
were coming from villages carrying food, bedding
and even fuel for warming their bodies. All the
main roads were blocked by thousands of people.
The smallest procession was at least a mile long
covering the entire width of the road including the
footpaths. The temperature was ranging at night
to several degrees below the freezing point. The
sun never came out and it was raining and snowing
all the time. All play grounds and other places of
meetings were frozen with several inches of solid
ice on the surface, yet three public meetings had
collected between fifty to seventy thousand people.
The Ministers were virtual prisoners confined to
their houses with police guards protecting them.

All public institutions and offices were guarded by
armed police. A vehicle, to be able to come out on
the public roads, had to carry a black flag. Most of
the [government] staff were also amongst the [protesting] crowd. Small periods were regulated when
groceries and vegetable shops could be opened for
the convenience of the people. Every wall of the
city was full of posters, and every house had a black
flag (Mullik 1971: 129).
During this time, the printing presses across Kashmir
remained closed due to the hartal and no newspapers could
be published (Mullik 1971: 130, 134). With the government
and the administration of Khwaja Shamas-ud-din, the local
Prime Minister, appearing almost paralysed and unable
to make any interventions to overcome the situation,
the local officers of the state had started reporting to
Mr. Viswanathan instead (Bhat 1980: 106). Amidst the
breakdown of state machinery, a rumor surfaced on 30
December that the relic had been recovered, and that a
couple of people from Kangan, in the outskirts of Srinagar,
had been arrested for the theft. Sanaullah Bhat, the editor
of the most popular Urdu newspaper of the Valley, Aftab,
promptly sought a meeting to confirm the rumour with
the Deputy Inspector General of Jammu & Kashmir Police,
Ghulam Qadir Ganderbali, who had set up a special cell
inside the Shergarhi Police Station, in Srinagar to probe
into the theft.
Ganderbali looked somewhat anxious, and on being asked
about the validity of the claim that the relic had been
recovered, responded by posing a counter question to
Bhat: “if the relic is recovered would people doubt its
authenticity?” Bhat soon realized that the news of the
recovered relic was a hoax floated by the government to
anticipate public response (Bhat 1980: 107). The next day,
another rumor that the relic had been recovered from a
boat near the Hazratbal shrine gained ground. Supposedly,
a person had wrapped the relic in a shawl and left it there.
Though Bhat was convinced that it was only a rumour,
he nevertheless sought to confirm the news. On being
told by Ganderbali that it had indeed been recovered and
that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had gone to Delhi to
get the silver bottom of the relic cover repaired, he was
absolutely stunned. When asked by Bhat why the news of
the recovery was not shared with the public, Ganderbali’s
cautious response was that unless they were convinced
that nobody would challenge its genuineness, they could
not risk a public disclosure (Bhat 1980: 107). Obviously, the
government was not only aware of the implications of not
being able to recover the relic, but also the authenticity of
the recovered relic.
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An Action Committee had also been formed to assist
with the recovery of the relic, the Jamiat Hasoole Moi-eMuqaddas (Bhat 1980: 108).16 The Committee was a union
of otherwise oppositional figures: Farooq Abdullah and
Maulana Masoodi, the supporters of Sheikh Abdullah,
Mirwaiz Farooq, the eminent religious cleric and Ghulam
Mohiuddin Karra who were pro-Pakistan, the Shia leader
Abbas Ansari, and even Peer Saad-ud-din Tarbali, the state
President of the Jamat-i-Islami, all of whom apparently
advocated a popular referendum as a means to resolve the
impending political issue of Kashmir. This rare demonstration of unity following the theft of the relic only reveals
the significance of the relic and its authority to bring
together different leaders and sections of the community,
under a single platform (Lockwood 1967: 387).
Meanwhile, as the campaign for the recovery of the
moi-e-muqaddas became stronger, the demand for Sheikh
Abdullah’s release from captivity became equally vociferous.17 Posters were also issued demanding the resolution
of the Kashmir issue by the United Nations, while seeking
the intervention of Muslim countries including Pakistan
in the matter. Mullik felt that the propaganda was entirely
fuelled by the Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir Radios, who
blamed India for the disappearance of the moi-e-muqaddas
with the purpose of breaking the morale of the Kashmiri
Muslims. Nevertheless, he acknowledged, “that large
numbers of people in the Valley started believing this
slander” (Mullik 1971: 132-133). A copy of a letter alleged
to have been sent by Abdullah to Nehru was circulated in
the form of a poster. The poster stressed that the “Prime
Minister [Nehru] should accede to people’s demands and
do the right thing before the situation went completely out
of control” (Mullik 1971: 134, 139). In fact the protesting
public had by now coined a new slogan:
Yeh mulk hamara hai
Iska faisla hum karenge
[This is our mulk; we shall decide its future]
(Gauhar 1998: 96)
The Indian government was not only concerned about
the implications that the relic theft had brought about
in Kashmir, but also the more serious repercussions it
could have in the Muslim world. The government felt that
“Pakistan would use this as a lever both to move the Security
Council” and also meddle with the affairs of Kashmir in the
Valley. Thus, only the recovery of moi-e-muqaddas could save
the situation for them (Mullik 1971: 135).18
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The Relic Returns
On 4 January around 6:15 pm an announcement from
Radio Kashmir, Srinagar confirmed that the relic had been
recovered. The announcement was very short and concise:
“Today in the afternoon of 4 January, the moe-i-mubarak
was found inside the Hazratbal mosque. Its authenticity
has been attested by the concerned individuals. Further
investigation is on in the matter.” The All India Radio
also made repeated announcements confirming that the
relic had been recovered. However, agitation and protests
continued as usual (Bhat 1980: 108-109).
On 5 January, which was a Sunday, Mr. Viswanathan called
a press conference at the Guest House in Srinagar. He
told the journalists that the relic would soon be restored
inside the Hazratbal shrine. He also announced that the
CBI would conduct further investigation into the matter,
and the case would be taken up by a court. However, none
of the local newspaper correspondents were invited for
the press conference. And those who were invited were
all non-Muslims who reported for newspapers outside the
state (Bhat 1980: 109).
Meanwhile, the Jamiat Hasoole Moi-e-Muqaddas held a
meeting at Lal Chowk, Srinagar and made following
demands on the government:
i. That the relic should not remain in the custody of
the state authorities but promptly restored inside
the Hazratbal shrine premises.
ii. That the relic should be identified and authenticated by a joint committee consisting of representatives appointed by people, and officials from the
government side.
iii. That the relic incident should be thoroughly
investigated by the CBI.
iv. That the hearing of the case should be conducted under the auspices of a high court judge from
outside of the State.
v. That all those people arrested during the agitation should be released (Bhat 1980: 109-110).19
The Committee also made an appeal to the public to stop
the ongoing hartal and not participate in any programs
or protests without its permission. Despite the appeal the
situation remained full of discontent, though the intensity
of crisis decreased a bit (Bhat 1980: 110; Lamb 1991: 205).
Meanwhile on 6 January, the government issued a circular
asking all the employees of the state to attend their offices
punctually. The circular stated that “any government

servant or employee of a government undertaking found
absenting himself from work will be immediately placed
under suspension with a view to his dismissal from
service.”20 The reasoning behind the circular was that since
the sacred relic had been recovered there was no longer
any cause for mourning. The circular also declared “that
full police protection would be provided for the shops
doing business, and anybody molesting persons engaged
in their normal avocations or obstructing or intimidating
persons will be severely dealt with.”21 However, on the
same day more than two hundred thousand people arrived
in processions from across the city and far off villages
and assembled in Lal chowk to hear Maulana Masoodi,
who was due to address this gathering. When a volunteer
unfurled an umbrella to shield him from the falling snow,
he snatched it and threw it aside. Immediately, in a gesture
of unity, thousands of umbrellas were similarly rolled shut,
as Masoodi continued to speak to a rapt audience for more
than an hour, as they raised occasional slogans saying: we
want immediate recovery of moe-i-sharief, we want plebiscite (Gauhar 1998: 97).
On 8 January, Mr. Viswanathan convened a second press
conference. Unlike previously, the local press reporters
were also invited to attend. However, when Sanaullah Bhat
drew his attention towards the popular demand for the
identification of the holy relic, Viswanathan responded
dismissively saying that whoever was demanding this
was speaking the language of Pakistan (Bhat 1980: 110).
Viswanathan was also unmoved to respond to any question related to the relic theft and the subsequent process
that led to its recovery (Bhat 1980: 110). His diplomatic
rejoinder, in conformity with a press-note issued by the
Home Ministry, Government of India stated that whoever
had stolen the relic fearing that he may be caught, had
returned it back (Bhat 1980: 110). Eventually on 10 January
the relic was reinstalled inside the Hazratbal shrine at 9:00
pm on the orders of the District Magistrate. Mullik says the
restoration was done in the late evening to avoid undue
excitement or crowding on the way (Mullik 1971: 148). The
traditional custodians of the shrine carried the relic to
its place of installation. As soon as the relic arrived at the
shrine hundreds of people from around the Hazratbal area
flocked to the place despite a bitter and terrible weather.
A government statement claimed that “women burst into
prayerful singing which lasted for some hours and all
those inside and outside the shrine joined in the prayers.
The sacred shrine was immediately illuminated.”22 Orders
were also issued by the District Magistrate that the relic
be kept in an iron safe, whose keys were to remain with
the local Inspector General of Police for the time being.23
On this occasion, Prime Minister Shams-ud-din issued a

press statement seeking appreciation for his government
for standing up to its obligation of recovering the relic and
redeeming its promise to the Kashmiri people. His administration, the Prime Minister claimed, had fully shared
the grief and pain of the people at the loss of the sacred
relic. Shams-ud-din also announced that all “government
offices throughout the state will remain closed tomorrow”
and that “there will be illuminations on all government
buildings, offices and shops.” He also offered to spend one
hundred thousand rupees on making Hazratbal shrine safe
and secure, and to preserve what he described as the great
“national relic for all times.”24
Just before departing for Delhi, on 14 January, the Home
Secretary called another press conference to reply to
questions on the authenticity and the identification of
the moi-e-muqaddas. He said the relic was genuine and he
did not want to enter into any discussion on the question.25 When asked whether a public viewing of the relic
would be allowed, Viswanathan’s response was that it
might be due for deedar on 6 February. However, popular
resentment did not subside completely. Many people still
carried black flags in their hands, and others still had
them tied to their vehicles.26
The Public Deedar
Asli mujrim ko pesh karo
[Produce the real culprit]
While a large section of people believed that it was Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammad who had engineered the theft,
there was no conclusive evidence to support the theory.
There were others who thought Bakshi was by birth and
family tradition a committed devotee of Hazratbal, and
therefore, would not desecrate the moi-e-muqaddas. The
First Information Report (FIR) lodged by the government
included the pro-Pakistan leader Mohi-ud-din Karra,
Sheikh Rashid, a nephew of Sheikh Abdullah, and one M.S.
Qureshi as the offenders. Apparently, their objective was
to destabilize Bakshi and eliminate his hold on Kashmir
politics. Yet another section of people believed that Nehru
had green signalled such steps to cause the political death
of Bakshi, who by 1963 had lost his political utility for the
Indian state (Gauhar 1998: 100-101). There was also an
opinion that Sheikh Abdullah wanted to encourage the
relic agitation for personal gain and may perhaps well
have engineered the theft through some of his contacts in
the Valley, while he was himself suffering in the jail. G.N.
Gauhar, a local high court judge, who was witness to the
entire incident, mentions that Sheikh was a dejected prisoner. While he felt wronged and humiliated by Nehru and

HIMALAYA Volume 38, Number 2 | 69

India and was bitter about it, he also felt that Pakistan had
not come to his rescue and of Kashmir sufficiently enough.
Gauhar writes that Abdullah felt dismayed by the fact that
people in Kashmir had not reacted enough when he was
accused and subsequently arrested the second time around
in 1958, in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case [refer to endnote
17]. Thus, the relic theft, which the FIR claimed was plotted
by Sheikh Rashid among others, was supposed to facilitate
Abdullah’s release to rejuvenate his political life, and to
destabilise Bakshi, supposedly the main hurdle in their
way (Gauhar 1998: 101-103). These conspiracy theories
reveal the significance and the power of a religious symbol
to intervene upon the political life of a community, and the
different ways it could be used to make political gains.
However, before the relic had been ‘recovered’ or even
installed inside the shrine, 1200 miles away in Khulna in
East Pakistan, the news of the loss instigated communal
riots, as rumor gained ground amongst Muslims of the
subcontinent that the desecration was a deliberate Hindu
act. President Ayub Khan’s statement that Muslims of
Kashmir were not responsible for the missing of the relic,
and the Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s exhortation that
the Hindus must have stolen the relic and were jeopardizing the practice of Islam in India incited the workers
in the industrial suburb of Khulna, who gathered into a
procession of 20, 000, setting fire to buildings and looting
the shops run by the minorities (Ghosh 1998: 106-107; Das
2000: 287). While the Pakistan government stated that
twenty nine- people were killed, the Indian government
statements estimated the number of deaths at nearly 200.27
Following these incidents, a million Hindu refugees left
East Bengal to migrate into India (Chatterji 2007: 111). The
relic incident also provoked riots in Calcutta in the second
week of January 1964, and in Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh,
as the communal undercurrent spread around (Das 2000:
287). Thus the relic affair, while it emerged in a local
setting, also impinged on the broader Hindu-Muslim relations in the subcontinent and with some serious impact.
Meanwhile, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue in the
United Nations Security Council, pressing for its immediate resolution, enough to ring a few alarms in the Indian
camp. The Indian government, and its officers in the
state: Viswanathan and Mullik in turn blamed Pakistan
for inciting the Kashmiri Muslims and for convincing
them that the restored moi-e-muqaddas was not the real
one (Mullik 1971: 150; Bhat 1980: 112). While the hartal
and agitation had diluted by this point, the demand for
authentication of the relic did not end. In fact as a mark
of protest the shopkeepers in Srinagar, would close their
shops at 4:00 pm, before their stipulated time of closure
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(Bhat 1980: 112). With the situation not improving and the
demand for authentication of the relic growing louder,
Mullik and Viswanathan returned back to the Valley on
25 January (Mullik 1971: 151). On 30 January Lal Bahadur
Shastri, a Cabinet Minister in Jawaharlal Nehru’s government, was sent to Kashmir to assess the situation in the
state. Having reached Kashmir, Shastri met with Maulana
Masoodi, Mirwaiz Farooq, Farooq Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammad, Shams-ud-Din, and others in his effort to
resolve the situation. Two days after his arrival, the
government decided to allow a public deedar of the holy
relic on 6 February.
Sanaullah Bhat had different apprehensions though. He
felt that unless the relic was properly authenticated and
people were convinced that it was genuine, the deedar
might not be such a worthwhile exercise. In fact, there was
every indication that it would complicate matters enormously. Bhat thought that if the genuineness of the relic
could not be established at this moment, then doubts about
its authenticity would linger on for generations. However,
the authorities were not convinced. In their opinion
seeking the authentication of the relic was a risk in itself,
and they were not prepared to undertake it (Bhat 1980:
113). In fact both Viswanathan and Mullik were strongly
against holding the identification. They were worried if
the Action Committee gave a negative verdict of the relic,
it might lead to riots in the Valley, which in turn might
lead to riots in different parts of India as well. And if the
identification of the relic was important, Mullik’s opinion
was that it must be confined to men of religion and no
members of the Action Committee should be included in
the team of identifiers. Eventually it was decided that the
selection of the holy men who were to authenticate the
relic, be left to the Action Committee, while the Kashmir
government was to have no say in the matter (Mullik
1971:158-161).28 The authentication, a special deedar, was to
take place on 3 February.
On 3 February, the members of the Action Committee
arrived at Hazratbal along with the would-be identifiers
of the relic. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister Shamsud-Din, the Inspector General of Police, and many other
high-ranking officers were already present there (Bhat
1980: 114). Though the main crowd had been kept away
from the mosque, a large number of people had filtered
through, and the yard in front of the shrine was full. The
formal proceedings commenced at 1:30 pm, and were
carried out by Masoodi. The atmosphere, as Mullik writes,
was tense and electric, as Masoodi began delivering “a
religious-cum-political lecture to the holy men” (Mullik
1971: 161). Then he gave each of the fourteen identifiers a

copy of the Holy Koran and asked them to swear by it that
they would only give the correct verdict. The fourteen
took the oath. After this, Noor Din Banday, the mutawalli
of the shrine appeared before the gathering holding a big
box in his hands. The first to give verdict was faqir Meerak
Shah Kashani, the most revered pir (saint) of Kashmir.
While Mullik claims that Kashani uttered the single word,
haq (right) (Mullik 1971: 162), Bhat is of the opinion that
the faqir and others only cautiously remarked that “God
wishing it may with all certainty be the same” (Bhat 1980:
114). Bhat further believes that the relic was not shown
to anyone, and nobody verified its genuineness at that
moment (Bhat 1980:114). How much of this is true is not
easily ascertainable. But the intensity of the situation
could be realised from the fact even after the matter had
been settled, Nehru thoughtfully inquired of the diplomat
and his Foreign Secretary, Y.D. Gundevia, “what would
have happened if Masoodi had declared, at that moment,
that the bal (hair) wasn’t genuine”? (Swami 2007: 42). But
it did not come to that. Instead it was announced that the
relic had been verified and that there would be a public
deedar on 6 February. The crowd that gathered outside
appeared to have maintained composure and silence,
but their hearts as Bhat writes, were filled with be-dili
(dismay), tazazub (apprehension), and shak-o-shubah
(doubt) (Bhat 1980:114).
On 6 February on the occasion of the urs char-yaar (celebration to honour the first four caliphs of Islam), the
reinstalled moi-e-muqaddas was displayed to the public
from the Hazratbal shrine. A crowd of about 60, 000 people
had collected to witness the deedar (Mullik 1971: 164).
On the same day Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, and the Indian representative, M.C. Chagala,
were locked in an argument about Kashmir at the United
Nations. Nevertheless, the enigma around the relic
controversy did not to die, and the demand to know the
real culprit of the theft continued for months: asli mujrim
ko pesh karo (Malhotra 2010).
On 12 February, the Indian Home Minister, Gulzari Lal
Nanda informed the Parliament that the investigation in
the relic theft would be completed in a week and soon the
case would be referred to a court. While he claimed that
the culprits had been booked, he was not ready to divulge
their names. However, on 17 February, Nanda told the
Parliament that three people: Abdul Rahim Banday, the
head mutawalli of the Hazratbal shrine, Abdur Rashid, an
agricultural officer from South Kashmir town of Tral and
Qadir Bhat, a relatively unknown man had been arrested
in the relic theft (Bhat 1980: 115). But nothing emerged
out of these arrests. A couple of months later, Rashid

was released and reinstated to his former job. Rahim
Banday was also released on bail a few months later, but
was banned from exhibiting the holy relic, until Sheikh
Abdullah removed the ban in the late 1970s. As for Qadir
Bhat, his whereabouts remained completely unknown.
Thereafter, no other investigation, and no court cases were
conducted, and no further action was taken in this regard.
Apparently even the leaders of the Action Committee did
not insist on the trial (Bhat 1980: 116).
However, in the meanwhile, a couple of changes were
called for. Nehru, realised that the Shams-ud-din government could not function any more, and with Bakshi having
lost his usefulness to India, and having been discredited
recently, it was decided to hand over the reins of Kashmir
to Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq. Sadiq was seen in many
quarters as a man of integrity, and his elevation was
expected to usher a new phase in Kashmir’s politics (Bazaz
1964). Nehru, who was shaken by the relic experience, was
apprehensive, as Mullik writes, that unless some things
were done, another catastrophe might befall the Valley
and the anger of people of Kashmir would ultimately turn
against India (Mullik 1971: 167). Sadiq’s appointment was
thus an attempt towards restructuring India’s Kashmir
policy (Swami 2007: 42), which had come loose over the
last few months, but more so through the Bakshi years,
whose administration having served its purpose, was now
claimed to have been corrupt. Through the change of the
guard thus, Bakshi’s influence on the region’s politics was
sought to be curtailed, and a supposedly new approach
was to be adopted on Kashmir (Swami 2007: 42; Mullik
1971: 172).
There were also rumours that Sheikh Abdullah and his
associates who were under detention in the Kashmir
Conspiracy Case of 1958 would be released soon, which
they eventually were on the morning of 8 April 1964.
Perhaps this was another attempt on the part of Nehru
and his administration towards changing their approach
to Kashmir affairs, and to also assuage the feelings of its
people. Mullik says that Nehru realised that Abdullah had
a strong hold on the Kashmiri people and in the changed
circumstances no political settlement in the Valley was
possible without him (Mullik 1971: 172).29 The local anger
against Nehru along with the affirmation that his paralysis and eventually his death immediately after the relic
incident was a direct result of him having desecrated the
mosque: kedes darghan tsend (the shrine eliminated him),
speaks of the reverence and power that the Kashmir
people associate with the shrine, and the fury and pain
they felt at the theft of the relic (Gauhar 1998: 104).
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While some of these changes were on, what happened
to the Action Committee and its unity? Did it sustain?
Though its members stayed together for a while, and
sought to perpetuate the group as a political force in the
state, disagreements on basic issues, and other personal
rivalries returned to prove to be a handicap to the group’s
effective functioning (Lockwood 1969: 387). Finally on
20 June 1964, Mirwaiz Farooq, the pro-Pakistan religious
cleric, announced his decision to set up a separate political
party in the state: the Awami Action Committee. This led
to his removal from the previous Relic Action Committee,
following which the traditional sher-bakra rivalry30 between
the supporters of Abdullah and Mirwaiz became alive again.
Thus a unity forged by the theft of a sacred symbol thinned
out after a while, as the sentiment over the symbol diluted
following its recovery.
Conclusion
The protests following the relic episode while they initially
appeared to be limited in seeking its recovery following its
theft from the Hazratbal shrine, very soon came to influence many other aspects and processes that have shaped or
have been associated with the Kashmir issue. Not only did
the incident have implications inside the Valley, leading to
a heightened regional consciousness and a strong antiIndia sentiment among the Kashmiri Muslims, it also left
its imprint outside Kashmir, influencing India Pakistan
relationship, besides inciting communal riots across the
subcontinent, in a number of places. But more importantly,
the episode reveals how the displacement of a sacred
relic: the moi-e-muqaddas from its sanctuary, the Hazratbal
shrine, highly revered by Kashmiri Muslims, and a symbol
of their sacral consciousness, provides an occasion that not
only unites an otherwise internally divided Muslim community of the region, both socially and politically, particularly
through the establishment of the Action Committee,
also becomes an instrument to articulate their regional
consciousness in the process, as they demand the resolution of the Kashmir issue according to their own wishes: yeh
mulk hamara hai, iska faisla hum karenge. In general the relic
theft and its aftermath exemplifies how the sacred and the
political are deeply intertwined in Kashmir politics, and in
South Asia at large.
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Endnotes
1. Sacred is not an easy concept to define. Muslims
themselves compete over or debate different modes of
sacredness. See Desplat and Schulz 2012: 23. Sacred can
be a broad and a complicated category. In a more general
sense, the term serves to describe objects, people, places,
and superhuman agents charged with a power, a quality,
or an essence set apart from its opposite, the profane.
For example, sacred place might refer to a site associated
with a revered person, a miraculous event, or superhuman
power. See Cormack 2013: 4. Nevertheless, sacred objects
and places or spaces do not necessarily reflect an accurate
image of society but are symbols with which society
identifies itself. See Wheeler 2006: 4.
2. Bhat offers a vernacular perspective, excerpted from
various books mostly penned by local Kashmiris, on how
the relic made it to Kashmir and the miracles associated
with it.
3. On these occasions: Milad-un-Nabi and Mairaj-i-Alam,
the relic is displayed to the public. The public display and
procession of hairs at mosques and madrasas, especially on
the occasion of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, is
mentioned in a number of sources. See Wheeler 2006: 74.
4. Apparently during these occasions, around 100,000
people stay awake in the shrine through the whole night,
involving themselves in prayers. This is called shabkhwani.
5. The flow of blessing and grace. Baraka can be found
within physical objects, places, and people, as chosen by
God. It flows from God to those that are closest to God,
such as prophets and saints. Among other ways, one can
attain baraka by visiting holy shrines.
6. The pir-muridi relationship is central to Sufism in the
religious life of Islam.
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7. An orthodox religious group among Muslims that
denounces shrine worshipping and other social and
cultural practices ordinarily associated with the practice of
Islam as heretic.
8. A governing body/trust supposed to look after the
management and the maintenance of shrines in Kashmir.
9. The Kashmiri Muslim community was divided in two
camps. One camp espoused their support for National
Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah, while the other
camp supported Muslim Conference headed by Mirwaiz
Yusuf Shah, an influential religious cleric. The supporters
of the two camps were known as sher (lions) and bakra
(goats) respectively. While the National Conference
claimed to be secular in its political outlook, the Muslim
Conference appeared to advance the interests of the
Kashmiri Muslims. The rivalry between the two groups,
which emerged in the post 1930s, was quite legendary.
The two groups and their supporters had their influence
and control over specific mosques and neighbourhoods in
the Srinagar city. While the Hazratbal shrine was under
the control of the National Conference, the Jamia Masjid
in Srinagar was a strong hold of the Muslim Conference,
backed by the Mirwaiz family, who were very prominent.
10. Until 1965, the Jammu Kashmir state was headed
by a wazir-azam (Prime Minister). However, the Indian
government forced a change in the nomenclature to Chief
Minister, in tune with other Indian states.
11. To remerge from the sacred state (Ihram) which
a Muslim must enter in order to perform the major
pilgrimage (Hajj) or the minor pilgrimage (Umrah). A
pilgrim must enter into this state before crossing the
pilgrimage boundary, known as Miqat, by performing the
cleansing rituals and wearing the prescribed attire. Once
he returns from this state, the pilgrim has to perform the
desacralisation ritual (Ihlal), which includes shaving one’s
hair, cutting nails and removing the prescribed attire, the
Ihram clothing.
12. December is very cold in Kashmir. At the time of
the theft it had already snowed in the Valley. This is
corroborated by Inder Malhotra, a well-known journalist
from Delhi who was among the press-corps who visited
Srinagar to report on the crisis.

Thirty-eight charges of corruption were eventually
brought against Bakshi by a judicial investigator, of which
15 were proven. Bakshi thus hoped to use the chaos to
establish his indispensability to the Indian state. See
Swami 2007: 42.
15. The Pandits and Sikhs constitute the minority
community in Kashmir. The Pandits represent the Hindu
Brahmin community in Kashmir, and are supposed to be
very learned. While the Pandits claim to be the original
inhabitants of the Valley, they have not been supportive
of the political movement in Kashmir that seeks secession
from India. See Dhar, 2006.
16. The Holy Relic Action Committee was to be
spearheaded by Mirwaiz Farooq and Maulana Masoodi.
17. Sheikh Abdullah had been arrested in 1958 along with
twenty-two of his companions in the famous Kashmir
Conspiracy Case filed by the government of Kashmir and
the government of India. The trail of the case began in
1959, but it was later withdrawn in 1964. He had previously
been arrested in August 1953 by the Indian government
while serving as the Prime Minister of Kashmir, but later
released in 1958.
18. While replying to President Ayub Khan’s letter, Dr.
Radhakrishnan, the President of India communicated
to him India’s disappointment on his statement on “the
unfortunate theft of the Holy Relic from the Hazratbal
Mosque in Kashmir, which was a matter of sorrow for the
entire people of India, and was severely condemned by
our Prime Minister and myself. Your Foreign Minister’s
statement in this context was particularly unfortunate.
Without a shred of evidence the theft of the relic was
attributed to Hindus and a communal turn to the Hazratbal
incident was thus given in Pakistan from the beginning.
The Pakistani Press started the most virulent tirade
against India and did everything to rouse, communal
passions to an uncontrollable pitch. While the emotions
of the people in Pakistan over the theft of the sacred relic
were understandable, I am constrained to observe that
irresponsible and unrestrained statements and accusations
against India and the false cry of Islam in danger had the
inevitable effect of inciting the Muslim population of
East Pakistan to take revenge on the Hindus still living in
Pakistan.” See Foreign Affairs Record. 1964. X (1).

13. Moslems Riot Over Theft of Sacred Relic. Chicago
Tribune, December 29, 1963.

19. Bhat 1980: 109-110.

14. One popular version of events is that the
disappearance was engineered by Bakshi himself. In
October 1963 Congress had forced him to resign from
the Prime Minister’s office under the Kamraj Plan to be
replaced by a relative lightweight, Khwaja Shamsuddin.

21. ibid.

20. Department of Information, Government of J&K.
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22. Department of Information, Government of J&K.
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